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1.  Introduction 
Emerging market economies have experienced disruptive crises caused by such factors 
as their poorly developed financial systems, volatile macroeconomic policies, weak banking 
systems, high dependence on external capital flows and uncertain growth prospects. 
Accordingly, both the academic and the official sector have endeavoured to develop 
models  which  are  able  not  only  to  identify  weaknesses  and  vulnerabilities  in  emerging 
market economies, but also to send timely and correct signals about the onset of a financial 
crisis, the so-called early warning systems (EWS). 
Most of the EWS models developed so far have tried to signal the onset of currency 
and  banking  crises,  both  individually  or  jointly  determined  (so-called  twin-crises).  The 
seminal papers in the field are those by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and by 
Frankel and Rose (1996), while a thorough review of these models can be found in Berg, 
Borensztein and Pattillo (2004). 
Until now, however, little work has been done on ‘debt’ crises, which can be broadly 
defined as episodes of default or failure to be current on external obligations. The period 
since 1994 has witnessed large sovereign and corporate defaults, as well as difficulties in 
servicing foreign-currency debt. 
Currency and debt crises may be generated by common factors, such as unfavourable 
macroeconomic developments, deterioration in external financing conditions (e.g. a sudden 
reduction  in  capital  flows  or  a  sharp  rise  in  their  cost)  or  an  increase  in  the  extent  of 
international investors’ risk aversion. Nevertheless, currency and debt crises do remain quite 
distinct events, considering that: 
1)  The two types of crises are not perfectly correlated, as is shown in Sy Amadou (2003): 
a country may have a currency crisis unaccompanied by a debt crisis, or instead may 
fall into arrears or default on its external debt without any major disruption in the 
exchange rate, as happened in Pakistan in 1999. In a sample of 59 countries for the 
period from 1970 to 1999, Reinhart (2002) reaches similar conclusions: although in 
developing countries there is a strong link between currency crises and default, “… 
currency  crises  …  do  not,  in  about  one-half  of  the  cases  (even  in  developing 
countries), necessarily lead to default …”. 
2)  It is not clear what the causal relationship should be. In fact, one could expect a sharp 
depreciation of the exchange rate in response to an excessively high growth of the  
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external debt or a rapidly worsening scenario for the country’s financing needs; under 
such a scenario, investors might doubt the government’s ability to face its external 
obligations  and  therefore  start  selling  off  assets  denominated  in  that  particular 
currency. 
The literature on the empirical determinants of a debt crisis is quite small compared 
with the large body of theoretical and empirical work on currency and banking crises. A 
broad  classification  is  between  models  based  on  the  evolution  of  a  particular  set  of 
macroeconomic variables, that could lead to the build-up of a crisis, and models that extract 
information on the probability of a credit event from financial data and the market prices of 
widely traded financial instruments such as sovereign bonds or, more recently, credit default 
swaps (CDSs). As recognized by the IMF itself (2002), any macro-based model should be 
complemented with information on market expectations extracted from bond spreads as well 
as from CDSs. A detailed description of the above-mentioned categories of EWSs for debt 
crises can be found in Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2004). 
The  aim  of  this paper is  to  develop  an  EWS  for  sovereign  debt crises,  which  are 
broadly defined as episodes of outright default, failure of a country to be current on external 
obligations and substantial access to IMF resources. The EWS is based on a multinomial 
logit which allows for three regimes, labelled ‘tranquil’, ‘pre-crisis’ and ‘adjustment’. The 
model includes a large set of macroeconomic variables and is able to predict, in-sample, 78 
per cent of onsets of crisis while sending false alarms in 34 per cent of tranquil cases; its out-
of-sample  performance  is  very  similar,  with  70  per  cent  of  entries  into  crisis  correctly 
predicted and 20 per cent of tranquil cases triggering false alarms. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 covers the definition of debt crisis, the 
data set and the event study analysis; section 3 presents the econometric specification, i.e. 
the multinomial logit; section 4 concludes. 
2.  Definition of Debt Crisis, Data and Event Study Analysis 
In defining a debt crisis, the problem is that the event may take on different forms, 
ranging from an outright default on part or all of the stock of external or public debt, to debt-
servicing difficulties determined more by illiquidity than by insolvency. These increasing 
debt  servicing  difficulties  might  well  be  signalled  by  the  accumulation  of  interest  or 
principal arrears (see Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001) or by a worsening of the market  
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evaluation of a country’s creditworthiness, as measured by an increasing spread over US 
bonds or euro-denominated securities (see Pescatori and Sy, 2003). The very recent past has 
also witnessed many instances of outright default being prevented by large aid packages 
provided by the International Financial Institutions (e.g. Turkey in 2001 and Brazil in 2002) 
or by restructuring agreements with the private sector (e.g. Uruguay in 2002). 
In what follows, we will describe the procedure used to define the dependent variable, 
i.e.  the  occurrence  of  a  debt  crisis,  the  macroeconomic  variables  that  we  think  may  be 
significant in determining such an event and their behaviour before and after the occurrence 
of a crisis. All of this will serve as a necessary background for the econometric analysis 
developed in section 3. 
2.1.  A new definition of debt crisis 
Our debt crisis indicator is derived from data provided by the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance database (GDF), the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database 
(IFS), the Paris Club website and internal sources. 
More precisely, we have defined a debt crisis as an event when at least one of the 
following conditions occurs: 
1)  A country has officially declared a moratorium on public or external debt payments, 
1 or 
it has signed a debt restructuring or rescheduling agreement with official and/or commercial 
creditors. 
2 
2)  A country has missed payment of interest and/or principal on external obligations vis-a-
vis official and commercial creditors in an amount of more than 5 per cent of the debt 
service ratio paid by year-end. 
3 
                                                           
1  Data on sovereign defaults are essentially drawn from the database the Bank of Italy uses to run the 
quarterly sovereign risk assessment for Italian banks. 
2  Information about official debt restructurings has been mainly drawn from the Paris Club web site 
(www.parisclub.org) and the World Bank’s yearly publication Global Development Finance; this is the only 
source of information on commercial debt restructurings.  
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3)  A country has accumulated arrears of interest and/or principal on external obligations 
towards official and commercial creditors in an amount of more than 5 per cent of the total 
external debt outstanding by year-end. 
4  
4)  A country has received large assistance from the IMF, where large is defined as access to 
more than 100 per cent of its relative quota. 
5  
This definition includes the whole range of forms that a debt crisis can take: outright 
defaults, potential defaults avoided only thanks to a restructuring/rescheduling of external 
debt or to the interventions by the IFIs, mounting debt-servicing difficulties, possibly leading 
to a missed payment on the country’s external obligations or the accumulation of interest 
and/or principal arrears. 
Table 1 gives the chronology of crises from 1980 to 2002 for 28 emerging market 
economies with significant market access: 
6 for each country in the sample, the table shows 
the number of episodes as well as their average length. For the sample as a whole, we found 
44 debt crises with an average length of almost 7 years.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
3  According to the Bank of Italy’s methodology, missed payment is constructed, first by summing the 
“flow” of interest and/or principal arrears incurred by a country during the year and then by dividing this sum 
by the total debt service effectively paid by year-end. 
4  Arrears are constructed by first summing the stock of interest and/or principal arrears accumulated by a 
country in subsequent years and then by dividing this sum by the total external debt outstanding at year-end. 
5  The IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database hosts information on the country’s position 
in the Fund’s capital (i.e. its quota), on the amount of financial resources agreed in each program (typically 
Stand By Agreement and Extended Fund Facility) and on the amount of financial resources effectively drawn 
by the country. In order to detect a crisis, we take the ratio between the amount effectively drawn and the 
country’s quota in the Fund’s capital. 
6  In order to construct our sample, we started with the set of 31 emerging market economies included in 
the JPMorgan EMBI Global Diversified. As a second step, four countries (Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon 
and Ukraine) that lacked comprehensive macroeconomic time series were dropped while South Korea was 
included. After this second step, the dataset comprised the following 28 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Russia,  South  Africa,  Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. We also tried to include countries such as the Czech Republic, Hong 




EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND DEBT CRISIS EPISODES, 1980 – 2002 
 
Country  Number of crises  Years in crisis  Average length  Crisis episodes 
Argentina  2  15  7.5  1983 – 1995; 2001 - … 
Brazil  2  16  8.0  1983 – 1993; 1998 - … 
Chile  1  8  8.0  1983 – 1990 
China  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Colombia  1  1  1.0  1988 
Dominican Rep.  2  19  9.5  1982 – 1999; 2002 - … 
Ecuador  1  18  18.0  1983 – 2000 
Egypt  2  13  6.5  1980 – 1991; 1995 
El Salvador  2  5  2.5  1984; 1989 – 1992 
Hungary  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Indonesia  1  6  6.0  1997 - … 
Korea  3  6  2.0  1980 – 1981; 1984; 1997 – 1999 
Malaysia  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Mexico  2  13  6.5  1982 – 1992; 1995 – 1996 
Morocco  2  11  5.5  1983 – 1992; 1999 
Nigeria  1  17  17.0  1986 - … 
Pakistan  2  6  3.0  1981 – 1982; 1998 – 2001 
Panama  1  13  13.0  1983 – 1995 
Peru  3  16  5.3  1980; 1983 - 1996; 2000 
Philippines  2  9  4.5  1984 – 1991; 1994 
Poland  1  13  13.0  1981 – 1993 
Russia                 *  1  14  14.0  1989 - … 
South Africa  2  6  3.0  1985 – 1989; 1993 
Thailand  2  4  2.0  1981; 1997 – 1999 
Tunisia  1  1  1.0  1991 
Turkey  2  6  3.0  1980 – 1982; 2000 - … 
Uruguay  3  5  1.7  1983; 1986 - 1988; 2002 - … 
Venezuela  2  12  6.0  1984 – 1994; 1998 
Total  44    6.7   
Sources: authors’ calculations based on IMF and World Bank data. 
* Data prior to 1992 are for the former Soviet Union.  
 
For every country in the sample, Table 2 shows which, among the different factors 
mentioned above, are considered the main determinants of a crisis period.   
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Table 2  
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND DEBT CRISES’ DETERMINANTS 
 
  Entry 
into crisis 
Moratoria and 
debt restructurings  IMF position  Missed payments  Arrears 
Argentina  1983         
  2001         
Brazil  1983         
  1998         
Chile  1983         
Colombia  1988         
Dominican Republic  1982         
  2002         
Ecuador  1983         
Egypt  1980         
  1995         
El Salvador  1984         
  1989         
Indonesia  1997         
Korea  1980         
  1984         
  1997         
Mexico  1982         
  1995         
Morocco  1983         
  1999         
Nigeria  1986         
Pakistan  1981         
  1998         
Panama  1983         
Peru  1980         
  1983         
  2000         
Philippines  1984         
  1994         
Poland  1981         
Russia  1989         
South Africa  1985         
  1993         
Thailand  1981         
  1997         
Tunisia  1991         
Turkey  1980         
  2000         
Uruguay  1983         
  1986         
  2002         
Venezuela  1984         




2.2.  Variables used in the econometric specification 
Our  set  of  independent  variables  comprises  28  macroeconomic  and  financial 
indicators, largely drawn from the literature on debt sustainability: essentially, they measure 
the burden of external indebtedness, the resources allocated to servicing it, the country’s 
ability to generate foreign-currency revenues, the external monetary and financial conditions, 
the  net  capital  flows.  Table  3,  constructed  following  the  suggestions  in  Manasse  et  al. 
(2003), gives the mean of each variable in the entire sample, for non-crisis episodes, for the 
year before the onset of a debt crisis, for in-crisis years and for years before a country exits a 
crisis. 
7 
As  the  table  shows,  all  the  variables  that  measure  external  debt  (expressed  as  a 
percentage either of GDP or of exports) and the flow of resources allocated to its service 
(divided either by exports or by international reserves) clearly worsen in the years leading up 
to a crisis. Those variables are below sample average in non-crisis years, they increase in the 
year preceding a crisis, and most of them continue to rise during the crisis itself, dropping to 
significantly lower levels when a country exits from the negative event. 
The variables that measure the country’s ability to generate foreign-currency revenues 
show the opposite pattern, i.e. they significantly decrease in the years preceding a crisis: this 
is  the  case  of  export  growth,  as  well  as  more  general  openness  to  international  trade; 
moreover, debt crises are also determined by a sharp reduction in the growth rates of private 
capital flows.  
All the measures of the level of international reserves (scaled to GDP, short-term debt, 
total external debt) show a sharp reduction in the years leading up to a debt crisis, while the 
ratios  of  short-term  debt  (scaled  to  GDP,  international  reserves  and  total  external  debt) 
significantly increase from their levels in tranquil periods. 
 
                                                           
7  A complete description of all the macroeconomic variables used in the econometric analysis is given in 
















Central government budget balance / GDP  -3.3  -2.9  -3.3  -3.9  -2.9 
Current account balance / GDP  -1.9  -2.0  -3.7  -1.9  -1.2 
Current account balance / Short-term debt 
(*)  -16.7  -18.2  -33.3  -12.3  -19.2 
Export growth rate  7.4  9.4  1.9  5.2  8.9 
Federal funds rate  7.1  7.4  8.5  7.1  6.9 
Import growth rate  7.5  9.9  -0.4  5.7  9.3 
Inflation rate (end of period)  72.8  21.2  20.6  173.1  73.6 
Interest on external debt / International reserves  75.9  47.9  142.5  117.0  57.8 
International reserves / GDP  8.7  10.0  6.5  6.2  9.3 
International reserves / Imports (in months of cover)  5.1  5.1  4.7  4.6  5.9 
International reserves / Short-term debt 
(*)  101.8  125.5  73.6  58.0  127.5 
International reserves / Total external debt  21.5  29.0  14.0  9.6  18.3 
International reserves growth rate  18.4  14.3  0.9  28.7  25.3 
Net inward direct investment / GDP  1.4  1.6  1.0  1.2  1.5 
Openness to international trade  43.9  47.9  36.9  37.8  40.9 
Private capital flows growth rate  98.8  74.7  24.0  66.9  535.1 
Private capital flows / GDP  2.7  3.1  3.6  2.6  1.7 
Real effective exchange rate  101.4  110.4  117.2  87.7  87.6 
Real GDP growth rate  3.4  4.4  2.4  2.2  3.1 
Short-term debt 
(*)/ GDP  13.0  11.4  13.4  15.5  10.7 
Short-term debt 
(*)/ International reserves  275.5  196.7  410.1  411.1  174.9 
Short-term debt 
(*)/ Total external debt  24.8  26.7  28.5  21.7  21.0 
Terms of trade  107.5  106.9  113.3  109.8  97.7 
Total debt service / Exports  44.7  37.2  54.9  54.9  46.1 
Total debt service / International reserves  173.2  120.5  357.5  244.1  116.2 
Total external debt / Exports  318.0  232.9  336.8  454.1  333.9 
Total external debt / GDP  50.6  41.1  47.0  65.9  51.0 
Trade balance / GDP  -1.4  -1.9  -3.4  -0.1  -2.3 
Sources:  IMF,  World  Economic  Outlook,  Sept.  2004;  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance,  2004;  Economist 
Intelligent Unit; authors’ calculations 
(*) Short term debt is measured on a remaining maturity basis. 
2.3.  Event study analysis 
Event study analysis complements the simple descriptive statistics and is a useful tool 
to investigate the behaviour of explanatory variables around default episodes and to give a  
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graphical interpretation of it. The results of the event study analysis are shown in Chart 1: 
the bold horizontal line represents the average value of the variable during tranquil periods, 
whereas the solid line shows the average value of the variable during stress times with a 95 
per cent confidence interval around it, identified by the two dotted lines. Time goes from t-3 
to t+3, where t is the year in which our debt crisis indicators is equal to one for the first time, 
thus signalling a crisis entry. The event study analysis suggests the following results: 
-  Measures of external debt service are significantly different during crisis periods with 
respect to tranquil times: interest payments on external debt, which average 54 per cent of 
the level of international reserves during non-crisis periods, more than double in the year 
preceding  a  credit  event  and  become  increasingly  larger  in  the  crisis  year  and  in  the 
following one; total debt service, which includes principal repayments as well, displays a 
similar pattern, regardless of whether it is expressed as a percentage of international reserves 
or of exports; total external debt to GDP increases during the run-up to a crisis and, at t+1, it 
becomes significantly higher than its average in tranquil periods. 
-  Real GDP growth rates are not only significantly lower during pre-crisis years than the 
tranquil periods’ average, but they exhibit a further worsening during a crisis period, shifting 
from an average of 4 per cent to nearly 0. 
-  Measures of the level of international reserves change significantly during crisis periods: 
in particular, the level of reserves as a percentage of total external debt drops from 25.2 per 
cent during tranquil times to 14.4 in the year preceding a crisis. 
-  Measures of external debt show revealing patterns: total external debt as a ratio to GDP 
increases from about 45 per cent in the years before a crisis to 60 per cent in the year after 
the credit event. Short-term debt over international reserves increases sharply in the run-up 
to a crisis, from about 220 per cent to 383 per cent. Short-term debt over total external debt 
is significantly higher than its average level during tranquil periods in all the years preceding 
the onset of a debt crisis.  
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-  Federal funds rates are significantly higher, in the years before a crisis erupts, than the 
average for tranquil periods: this suggests that the higher the interest rate in the US, the 
harder it is for an emerging country to close its financing gaps.   
Among  other  variables,  we  found  that  private  capital  flows  are  not  statistically 
different,  in  crisis  years,  from  the  average  in  tranquil  periods  (at  least  at  a  95 per  cent 
confidence level) but they show a steady declining pattern. This suggests that international 
investors provide financing to emerging market countries up to the year before a credit event 
occurs, withdrawing their funds thereafter.  












































3.  A Multinomial Logit Early Warning System for Debt Crises 
3.1.  Econometric specification and estimation results 
To find out which variables are significant in determining the onset of a debt crisis, we 
performed an econometric specification originally suggested by the work of Bussiere and 
Fratzscher  (2002).  More  precisely,  we  have  constructed  a  multinomial  logit  with  three 
regimes: a tranquil period, during which macroeconomic and financial variables are on a 
sustainable  path;  a  pre-crisis  event,  during  which  the  levels  assumed  by  a  subset  of 
macroeconomic and financial variables lead the country to experience a debt crisis in the 
following years; an adjustment phase, when the level of the macroeconomic variables revert  
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to a more sustainable path. The main difference with Bussiere and Fratzcher’s seminal paper, 
besides the frequency of observations (monthly vs. annual), is that their model applies to 
currency, rather then debt, crises. 
The multinomial logit approach has a great advantage over the simple binomial logit 
used, for instance, by Manasse et al. (2003), in that it makes it possible to construct more 
than  two  regimes  and,  thus,  to  model  explicitly  the  ‘crisis  entry’  as  opposed  to  the 
‘adjustment’ regime. In fact, it has been shown that the multinomial logit produces better 
econometric results, since it tackles the so-called post-crisis bias. This can be traced back to 
the difference between the behaviour of macroeconomic variables in the run-up to a crisis 
and  the  behaviour  during  the  post-crisis  adjustment  period.  Disregarding  this  different 
behaviour of independent variables, as may occur in a simple binomial logit model, can lead 
to biased coefficient estimates. 
Taking into account this suggestion, we tried to apply the multinomial logit approach 
to the task of predicting debt crises. More precisely, the objective is to predict debt crises 
one or two years before they actually occur. For this reason, we have defined the three 
different regimes according to the rule shown in Table 4.   
Table 4 
REGIME DEFINITION IN THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
 
Definition of crisis as in section 2.1  Regime in the multinomial 
At time t  At time t+1  At time t+2  Model at time t 
0  0  0 
1  0  0 
Tranquil (Y = 0) 
0  0  1 
0  1  0 
0  1  1 
Pre – crisis (Y = 1) 
1  1  0 
1  1  1 
1  0                   1              * 
Adjustment (Y = 2) 




The  selection  of  a  two-year  horizon  in  the  definition  of  the  dependent  variable  is 
related to the need of using the EWS as a regular tool for policy analysis. Publication lags of 
macroeconomic data reduce the nominal forecast horizon in practical applications, while 
implementation of pre-emptive policy measures would require a long time-span between the 
signal and the credit event. Using yearly frequency would linearly decrease the effective 
forecast horizon within the year to zero before the inclusion of a new observation, while the 
use of a two-year forecast horizon would help in part to mitigate this issue. Unfortunately, a 
longer forecast horizon implies a higher forecast variance. 
Consistently with the binomial crisis indicator specified in section 2.1 - ‘0’ for no 
crisis, ‘1’ for crisis - at time t through time t+2, we have defined the multinomial regimes 
according to the following rule: a tranquil state is defined as the case in which the economy 
will not experience a crisis in the future (i.e. at times t+1 and t+2) regardless of the current 
state (i.e. at time t), while a pre-crisis period is a situation in which an economy will face 
trouble in either or both of the following two years, provided that the crisis indicator is ‘0’ at 
time  t.  All  the  other  cases  are  treated  as  ‘adjustment’  periods  after  a  crisis  has  already 
erupted and it is still unfolding. 
The  multinomial  model  is  estimated  with  maximum  likelihood,  with  the  tranquil 
period as the benchmark, and using as regressors the set of 28 macroeconomic and financial 
variables that were the subject of the event study analysis. The entire sample runs from 1980 
to  2002  but,  considering  a  three-year  estimation  time  period,  we  have  been  forced  to 
disregard all the variables recorded both in 2001 and 2002. The final regression sample, 
therefore, contains 588 observations. Macroeconomic data at time t are use to predict crisis 
events at times t+1 and t+2. 
The probability of a country being in one of the three states is computed as follows: 
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where Y=0, 1, 2 identifies, respectively, the tranquil regime (the benchmark state), crisis 
entry and the adjustment regime. Therefore, the vectors of coefficients b1 and b2 give a 
measure of the marginal effect of a change in the explanatory variables on the probability of 
being in state 1 or 2 relative to the probability of being in the tranquil regime, as shown in 
Equation (4): 
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Our estimation approach envisages three different steps: 
-  First, we run multinomial logit regressions for each of the 28 variables independently 
from one another, excluding all the variables that turn out to be insignificant in determining 
the probability of ‘entering’ and the ‘being’ in an adjustment phase, as well as the variables 
that,  although  significant,  have  a  counterintuitive  sign.  This  may  raise  some  issues 
concerning omitted variables which, on their turn, may render coefficient estimates biased 
and  inefficient,  leading  to  the  exclusion  of  variables  that  should  be  otherwise  retained 
(Visco, 1978): we are aware of this drawback, which we address it in the third step.  
-  Second, we run so-called group-wise regressions, i.e. we group in families - essentially 
according to their nature - all the variables that got through the first step and then we run 
new multinomial logit regressions for each of these groups. As in the first phase, we retained 
only those variables that turned out to be significant and had the correct sign.  
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-  Finally, we put together all the variables that got through the first and the second steps 
into a general multinomial logit regression. We restore variables that, for example, were 
found to be significant in the literature or displayed a particular behaviour in the event study 
analysis, but were dropped in either the first or the second steps. 
8 Using a ‘general-to-
specific’  approach  in  order  to  achieve  a  parsimonious  model,  we  again  drop  all  the 
insignificant variables. 
At the end of this procedure, we retain just eight variables: the ratio of total external 
debt  to  exports; the  federal  funds  rate; the  interest  payments  on  external  debt  scaled  to 
international  reserves;  the  real  GDP  annual  growth  rate;  the  ratio  of  short-term  debt 
(calculated on a residual maturity basis) to total external debt; the total private capital flows 
on GDP; the annual inflation rate; the ratio of international reserves to total external debt.  
Table 5 summarizes the results obtained from the estimation of the multinomial model. 
The  first  part  of  the  table  is  the  most  important  as  it  shows  estimates  for  b1,  giving 
information  about  the  likelihood  of  the  economy’s  entering  a  crisis  within  two  year  as 
opposed to the likelihood of its remaining in a tranquil state. The second part of the table 
refers  to  estimates  for  b2:  these  coefficients  give  information  about  the  likelihood  of  a 
country’s continuing to be in a recovery state as opposed to the likelihood of its returning to 
a tranquil state, where macroeconomic variables are on a sustainable path. 
 
 
                                                           
8  This is essentially done in order to avoid the so-called omitted-variable bias, which arises when a 
significant explanatory variable is not taken into account in the regression, determining a significant correlation 
between the other regressors and the residual term. The omitted-variable bias is still more worrisome in non-
linear estimation, such as the one we are performing here, since unlike ordinary least squares it is present 
whether  or  not  the  omitted  regressors  are  correlated  with  the  included  ones.  Two  problems  may  arise  in 
connection with the omitted variable bias. On the one hand, variables that are not part of the true model may be 
retained because the bias, induced by some omitted variable, makes them look significantly different from zero. 
This problem should be mitigated by the fact that the model is estimated in the first step using a large set of 
regressors that, hopefully, includes most of the true variables. On the other hand, the bias may cause the 
rejection of a variable that is part of the data generating process. This problem is addressed by adding variables 




MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Z-Statistics  P-value 
Pre – crisis period (Y=1)       
CONST.  -4.39661  0.59114  -7.43748  0.00000 
TEDGDP  0.01881  0.00831  2.26357  0.02360 
FEDFUNDS  0.11367  0.03444  3.30027  0.00100 
INTDEBTRES  0.00892  0.00235  3.78796  0.00020 
REALGDP  -0.06079  0.02865  -2.12191  0.03380 
STDRMBTED  0.02280  0.01057  2.15632  0.03110 
TOTCAPFLOWS  0.06897  0.01887  3.65588  0.00030 
       
CONST.  -2.77961  0.49251  -5.64375  0.0000 
TEDGDP  0.05095  0.00670  7.60419  0.0000 
INFL  0.00215  0.00044  4.92801  0.0000 
RESTED  -0.07210  0.01834  -3.93212  0.0001 
INTDEBTRES  0.00790  0.00249  3.17298  0.0015 
Pseudo R-squared  0.27664       
 
According  to  the  results  of  our  estimation  procedure  reported  in  Table  5,  we  can 
conclude that: 
-  The amount of interests a country has to pay on its external debt obligations, scaled 
to international reserves, has a positive marginal effect on the probability of entering 
and being in a crisis: the higher the interest payments, or the lower the level of 
international reserves, the higher the probability of outbreak of a debt crisis - in the 
form of a missed payment or the accumulation of arrears - or the more difficult it is 
to exit from an ongoing crisis. 
-  The  higher  the  burden  of  external  indebtedness,  measured  as  the  ratio  of  total 
external debt to GDP, the higher the probability of outbreak of a debt crisis and the 
more difficult it is to exit from an ongoing one.  
 
26
-  The real GDP growth rate seems to have a positive marginal effect on the probability 
of  entering  a  crisis:  countries  with  higher  growth  rates  are  considered  more 
creditworthy than others, making international investors more willing to lend.  
-  The federal funds rates have a positive marginal effect on the probability of entering 
a debt crisis: higher funds rate determines tighter liquidity conditions in international 
capital markets, leading to capital rationing or higher borrowing rates.
9  
-  The  higher  the  ratio  of  short-term  debt  to  total  external  debt,  the  higher  the 
probability of incurring a debt crisis.  
-  Total private capital flows as a ratio to GDP have a positive marginal effect on the 
probability of entering into a debt crisis. This may be related to the observation that 
international investors seem to provide financing to emerging market countries up to 
the onset of a credit event. 
-  Inflation rates seem to have a positive marginal effect on the probability of being in 
an  adjustment  phase.  This  might  be  due  to  inverse  causality,  i.e.  episodes  of 
hyperinflation  generated  by  a  debt  crises  coupled  with  a  currency  crisis.  Such  a 
situation can make an economy more fragile and a crisis more persistent. Moreover, 
the  restrictive  monetary  policy  needed  to  fight  high  inflation  could  increase  the 
burden of a country’s indebtedness, especially in those cases where a large portion of 
debt is linked to inflation. 
-  Countries  with  high  levels  of  international  reserves,  scaled  to  total  external 
indebtedness, are better placed to overcome negative credit events. 
                                                           
9  There is a strand of empirical literature (reviewed in Mc Guire, P. and Schrijvers, M.A., 2003) that 
argues, in fact, that US monetary policy has a direct effect on the yield differentials between developed and 
developing bonds of the same characteristics. A restrictive monetary policy stance on the part of the FED goes 
along with wider spreads on emerging market sovereign debt.   
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3.2.  Predictive ability 
A first important test to evaluate the predictive ability of the model is to look at its in-
sample predictive ability: a particular cut-off level, or threshold, has to be identified, above 
which the predicted probability could be considered as sending a signal that a crisis is about 
to occur. The question now is how this ‘optimal’ threshold should be calculated: the lower 
the threshold, the more signals the model will send, with the risk of many false alarms for 
crises that would never occur; the higher the threshold, the lower the numbers of signals, 
with the risk of not capturing the onset of a crisis that actually does occur in the forecast 
horizon.  The  former  can  be  called  ‘type  1’  errors,  the  latter  ‘type  2’  errors,  if  the  null 
hypothesis is no crisis. The choice of the ‘optimal’ threshold for the predicted probabilities 
will  have  to  mediate  between  these  two  types  of  error,  and  will  depend  on  which  is 
considered more worrisome by the analyst. Since a precise rule to determine the ‘optimal’ 
cut-off level does not exist, this problem has been resolved by classifying an observation as 
predicting  a  crisis  when  the  estimated  probability  exceeds  the  in-sample  frequency  of  a 
crisis, i.e. when the economy goes from a tranquil state (Y=0 in the multinomial regime 
definition in Table 4) to a crisis (Y=1 in Table 4). Analogously, a threshold based on in-
sample frequency has been established to determine the exit from a crisis, i.e. when the 
economy goes from a crisis state (Y=1 in Table 4) to a tranquil time (Y=0 in Table 4) instead 














                                                           
10  The threshold used for signaling entry into crisis is 12 per cent, while that for signaling being in a crisis 
is 32 per cent: these levels have been calculated as the in-sample frequencies of crisis entries and adjustment 





MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL: IN-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE 
 
True state  Correctly called  Not correctly signalled  Total     
Pre – crisis  31  9  40  Number of observations correctly called   71% 
Adjustment  158  45  203 
Number of crisis correctly called  
(2 years in adv.)  73% 
Tranquil  206  104  310  Overall number of crisis correctly called   78% 
Total  395  158  553 
 
Number of false alarms  34% 
   
Crisis entries correctly called (31):  Crisis entries not called (9) 
 
Argentina 1983, 2001 
Brazil 1983, 1998 
Chile 1983 
Dominican Rep. 1982 
Ecuador 1983 
El Salvador 1984 
Indonesia 1997 
Korea 1984,1997 







Peru 1983, 2000 
Philippines 1984 
Poland 1982 
South Africa 1985, 1993 
Thailand 1982, 1997 
Turkey 2000 
Uruguay 1983, 1986, 2002 
Venezuela 1984, 1998 
 
Colombia 1988 
Dominican Rep. 2002 
Egypt 1995 









The in-sample predictive ability of the model shows that the number of observations 
correctly called is 71 per cent and that the number of crises entries correctly picked up two 
years before the onset of the negative event is 73 per cent. Two more crises (Venezuela in 
1998 and Turkey in 2000) are signalled just one year in advance, bringing the total of crisis 
entries correctly called to 78 per cent.  
 The model fails to predict the exact timing of the crisis that broke out in Russia in 
1989 and lasted for the rest of the sample period (see Table 1): the crisis entry is in fact 
postponed to 1991 but, most importantly, when the crisis deepened in 1998 - with the default 
on ruble-denominated government bonds - the model correctly signals a high probability of a 
credit event. 
The  number  of  false  alarms,  i.e.  the  number  of  tranquil  periods  that  are  wrongly 
signalled  as  crisis,  is  about  34  per  cent:  in  104  cases  out  of  310  our  model  predicts  a 
turbulent period, when a tranquil period materialises instead thereafter.  
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The  predictive  ability  of  the  multinomial  logit  results  has  to  be  probed  also,  and 
especially, out-of-sample: we have re-estimated the model with macroeconomic data from 
1980 to 1998 and predicted crisis events from 1999 onwards. The multinomial logit seems to 
perform well: the results for the out-of-sample predictive ability are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL: OUT OF SAMPLE PERFORMANCE 
* 
 
True state  Correctly called  Not correctly signalled  Total      
Pre – crisis  4  2  6   Number of observations correctly called   70% 
Adjustment  12  16  28   
Number of crisis correctly called  
(2 years in adv.)  50% 
Tranquil  57  14  71   Overall number of crisis correctly called   67% 
Total  73  32  105   Number of false alarms  20% 
* The model is estimated with data up to 1998 to predict entries from 1999 onwards 
 
Going back to 1998, we would have been able to anticipate 4 out of 6 crisis episodes, 
namely Peru and Turkey in 2000, Argentina in 2001 and Uruguay in 2002, but we would 
have missed the 1999 crisis in Morocco and the 2002 crisis in the Dominican Republic. The 
results show another desirable feature of our model: the number of false alarms is reasonably 
low, with 14 out of 71 tranquil periods incorrectly signalled as crisis events. 
3.3.  Robustness Analysis 
Results from the multinomial logit estimation were tested for robustness along two 
lines 
First, we reconsidered the definition of debt crisis. The original one encompasses four 
different conditions: a) outright default and debt restructurings with substantial haircut, b) 
significant access to IMF resources, c) excessive missed payments, d) excessive arrears on 
total external debt. To test for robustness, we performed two regressions using different  
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combinations of the four conditions. In the first one, the dependent variable was derived 
from conditions a) and b) only; in the second one, we also added in condition c).      
Regarding the second line of action, we modified the thresholds used to identify a 
credit event. In the baseline scenario, a crisis occurs when one of the following conditions 
apply: a country has access to the IMF resources in excess of 100 per cent of its quota;  the 
amount of missed payments is above 5 per cent of total debt service; the amount of arrears is 
above  5  per  cent  of  total  external  debt.  We  modified  the  thresholds  according  to  two 
scenarios: in the first, the critical level for missed payments and arrears was increased to 10 
per cent; in the second, these levels were raised to 15 per cent, while the threshold for access 
to IMF resources was raised to 200 per cent of the quota.  
As a final step, we re-estimated the model on a sub-sample of countries. In particular, 
we dropped China, because of the relatively low reliability of its data, and Hungary, Poland 
and  Russia,  considering  that  their  past  political  regimes  could  have  influenced  their 
macroeconomic data. 
The results of all the regressions previously outlined, not reported here for the sake of 
brevity, show that the original estimates are robust to such modifications. 
11 
4.  Conclusions 
The paper focuses on debt crises episodes, whose importance has grown in the very 
recent past replacing currency crises as the major source of concern in emerging countries. 
The  recent  crises  in  Brazil,  Uruguay  and  Turkey,  with  their  potentially  disruptive 
consequences on the stability of the entire global financial system, have led academics and 
private sector analysts to focus their attention on early warning systems that can detect the 
onset of such crises in a timely manner. 
                                                           
11  The results of robustness analysis are available from the authors upon request.  
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Debt crises can take a variety of forms, ranging from outright default on part or all of 
the  stock  of  external  and/or  public  debt,  to  more  general  debt-servicing  difficulties 
determined more by illiquidity than by insolvency. This consideration led us to construct a 
new debt crisis indicator able to take these different forms of crises into account. We used 
the indicator to evaluate a series of debt crisis episodes in the period 1980-2002 involving a 
relatively large sample of emerging countries with significant access to international capital 
markets. 
The next step was to discover which factors, among a large set of macroeconomic and 
financial  variables,  were  at  the  roots  of  a  debt  crisis.  To  perform  this  task,  we  ran  a 
multinomial logit analysis which is characterised by three regimes instead of two, as in the 
classic logit models applied in debt crises literature until now. The variables found to be 
significant in explaining debt crisis episodes were mainly those that measure the burden of 
external  indebtedness  and  its  composition,  the  external  financing  conditions  and  other 
macroeconomic variables that measure the overall health of an economy, such as real GDP 
growth and inflation rates. The in-sample predictive power is good, with 78 per cent of crises 
episodes  correctly  called,  and  the  model  appears  to  be  robust  to  different  specifications 
regarding the dependent variable. Unfortunately, the model sends more than 30 per cent of 
false alarms. Finally, the out-of-sample predictive ability of our model turns out to be good 
as well, with a reasonably low level of false alarms, in the range of 20 per cent. 
EWS models could be very useful instruments to guide policy analysis on emerging 
markets. To improve their information content and predictive power, ideal models should 
aim at integrating the approach based on macroeconomic data, outlined in this paper, with 
information  extracted  from  market  instruments  (for  example,  sovereign  bonds  or,  more 
recently, credit default swaps). In order to integrate these two aspects, timely information on 
the relevant macroeconomic variables is needed along with reliable and robust market data. 
With more frequent macroeconomic data and a larger set of countries for which financial 
data are available, further research could be carried out with the aim of better integrating the 






Description of Regressors 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  SOURCE  NOTE 
CENGOVBALGDP  Central government budget balance / GDP  IMF-WEO 
Calculated as the ratio between series GCB (central government budget balance) 
and NGDP (gross domestic product, current prices,  national currency).  
Missing data: Poland, 1980. 
CAGDP  Current account balance / GDP  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series BCA (current account balance) and NGDPD 
(gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars).  
CASTDRMB  Current account balance / short term debt 
 (residual maturity basis)  IMF-WEO EIU 
Calculated as the ratio between series BCA (current account balance) and D_SRM 
(short-term debt outstanding, remaining maturity basis).  
Data for Korea are drawn from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. 
EXPGROWTH  Export growth  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the growth rate of the series BXG (exports of goods). 
FEDFUNDS  Federal funds  Bloomberg  We have calculated it as a yearly average of daily observations. 
IMPGROWTH  Import growth  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the growth rate of the series BMG (imports of goods). 
INFL  Inflation rate (end of period)  IMF-IFS  Calculated as the annual variation of PCPIE (consumer prices, end of period) 
INTDEBTRES  Interest on external debt / international 
reserves  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series DSI (total debt interest paid) and BRASS 
(stock of reserves at year end). 
RESGDP  International reserves / GDP  IMF-WEO 
Calculated as the ratio between series BRASS (stock of reserves at year end) and 
NGDPD (gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars). 




VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  SOURCE  NOTE 
RUIMP  International reserves / imports (in month 
cover)  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series BRASS (stock of reserves at year end) and 
BMG (imports of goods). Expressed in month of cover of imports. 
RESSTDRMB  International reserves / short-term debt 
(residual maturity basis)  IMF-WEO 
Calculated as the ratio between series BRASS (stock of reserves at year end) and 
D_SRM (short-term debt outstanding, residual maturity basis). 
Missing data: Hungary, 1980-1982; Korea, 1980-1981. 
RESTED  International reserves / total external debt   IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series BRASS (stock of reserves at year end) and 
D (total debt outstanding at year end). 
RESGROWTH  International reserves growth  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the growth rate of the series BRASS (stock of reserves at year end). 
FDIGDP  Net inward direct investments / GDP  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series BFD (direct investment, net) and NGDPD 
(gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars). 
OPEN  Openness to international trade  IMF-WEO 
Calculated as the sum of the series BXG (exports of goods) and BMG (imports of 
goods) divided by the series NGDPD (gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. 
dollars). 
CAPFLOWSGROWTH  Private capital flows (growth)  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the growth rate of the series BFXP (private capital flows, net). 
CAPFLOWSGDP  Private capital flows / GDP  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  BFXP  (private  capital  flows,  net)  and 
NGDPD (gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars). 
REER  Real effective exchange rate  IMF-WEO 
We have used the series in levels.  
Missing data: Nigeria, 1980; Russia, 1980-1993; Tunisia, 1980-1982; Uruguay, 
1980. 
REALGDP  Real GDP (growth)  IIF   
STDRMBGDP  Short-term debt (on a residual maturity 
basis) / GDP  IMF-WEO 
Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  D_SRM  (short-term  debt  outstanding, 





VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  SOURCE  NOTE 
STDRMBRES  Short-term debt (on a residual maturity 
basis) / international reserves  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  D_SRM  (short-term  debt  outstanding, 
residual maturity basis) and BRASS (stock of reserves at year end). 
STDRMBTED  Short-term debt (on a residual maturity 
basis) / total external debt  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  D_SRM  (short-term  debt  outstanding, 
residual maturity basis) and D (total debt outstanding at year end). 
TOT  Terms of trade  IMF-WEO  Series TTT (terms of trade, goods), in levels. 
TDSEXP  Total debt service / exports  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  DS  (total  debt  service:  interest  and 
amortization paid) and BXG (export of goods). 
TDSRES  Total debt service / international reserves  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  DS  (total  debt  service:  interest  and 
amortization paid) and BRASS (stock of reserves at year end). 
TEDEXP  Total external debt / exports  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series D (total debt outstanding at year end) and 
BXG (export of goods). 
TEDGDP  Total external debt / GDP  IMF-WEO  Calculated as the ratio between series D (total debt outstanding at year end) and 
NGDPD (gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars). 
TRADEBALGDP  Trade balance / GDP  IMF-WEO  Calculated  as  the  ratio  between  series  BT  (trade  balance)  and  NGDPD  (gross 
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